We develop a simple test to assess whether horizontal spillover e¤ects from multinational to domestic …rms are endogenous to the market structure generated by the incremental entry of the same multinationals. In particular, we analyze the performance of a panel of 10,650 …rms operating in Romania in the period 1995-2001. Controlling for the simultaneity bias in productivity estimates through semi-parametric techniques, we …nd that changes in domestic …rms'TFP are positively related to the …rst foreign investment in a speci…c industry and region, but get signi…cantly weaker and become negative as the number of multinationals that enter in the considered industry/region crosses a speci…c threshold. These changing marginal e¤ects can explain the lack of horizontal spillovers arising in traditional model designs. We also …nd these e¤ects to vary between manufacturing and services, suggesting as a possible explanation a strategic change in technology transfer decisions by multinational …rms as the market structure evolves.
Introduction
The debate on the existence of productivity spillovers from foreign direct investment (FDI), taking place through contacts between multinational (MNE) and domestic …rms in a hot topic in the international business literature. The growing important role of international capital ‡ows is also increasing the relevance of the debate in terms of policy implications: a con…rming stance is often taken as a justi…cation of expensive incentive packages for the attraction of foreign investors, while the evidence of negative e¤ects is likely to nurture protectionist arguments. Observing the strong heterogeneity in motives, sources and timing of multinational entry, it is actually disputable if all foreign entry is equally bene…cial for domestic …rms' productivity. As a result, empirical studies have not come up with a clear answer to the question whether domestic …rms bene…t from foreign investors or not.
Given the potential heterogeneity of scenarios leading to a result of insigni…cant spillovers, the aim of this paper is to provide a more precise measurement of the timing and direction of the dynamic e¤ects of MNEs' entrance. In particular, we develop a simple framework to test for the existence of a threshold number of foreign investors below which horizontal spillovers are positive, and above which there is a negative marginal e¤ect on domestic TFP (or the other way round).
If such a threshold exists for a positive number of multinational …rms, we can conclude that the concept of 'marginal' spillovers becomes relevant, i.e. the combined e¤ect of positive horizontal spillovers and competition from MNEs on domestic …rms'TFP is not constant, but rather varying with the progressive entry of new MNEs. The direction of variation (from positive to negative or the other way round) is then assessed by looking at the signs of the coe¢ cients.
The prediction of a non-constant marginal e¤ect is tested on a rich panel dataset containing information on some 10,650 local and multinational …rms in Romania, with balance sheet data available for the period 1995-2001, and …rm-speci…c FDI data which start in 1990. As FDI was virtually prohibited before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the sample allows us to track MNEs from the very …rst investment on, thus taking into account potential …rst-mover e¤ects. Anticipating our results, we …nd that in Romania a positive threshold number of MNEs exists, around which the impact on domestic …rms'TFP changes from positive to negative, thus highlighting the relevance of marginal spillovers. Moreover, we also …nd marginal spillover e¤ects to be industry-speci…c.
These results allow us to contribute to the analysis of MNEs'spillovers under a number of different perspectives. First of all, our …ndings contribute in explaining some of the reasons according to which traditional measures of horizontal spillovers identi…ed by the international business literature tend to be not signi…cant. Within the debate in the economics literature, we are also able to provide some methodological contributions to the traditional speci…cation of a spillover regression:
we control for and openly discuss a number of potential problems, among which a comparison of di¤erent TFP estimates employed to control for the simultaneity bias (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003 vs. Olley and Pakes, 1996) , and an analysis of the omitted price variable bias a¤ecting the same estimates. In particular, the latter bias is assessed through a modi…ed version of the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) semiparametric algorithm of TFP estimation. Our results also allow us to shed new light on policy recommendations for attracting foreign investors. If marginal spillovers are relevant and, as it is the case for Romania, the e¤ects on domestic …rms are initially positive and then declining as more MNEs enter, then FDI attraction policies should focus on industries where there is no or little foreign presence, since in these sectors the positive spillover e¤ect is likely to (still) outweigh the negative competition e¤ect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides some theoretical background on the spillover debate and presents our working hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the investment and TFP data employed in the analysis, while our methodology is discussed in section 4.
Section 5 analyzes the empirical results, performs some robustness checks and presents some policy implications. Finally, section 6 concludes discussing the managerial and policy implications of our …ndings and providing some future lines of research.
Theoretical background
Pioneering empirical studies on sector-speci…c data (e.g. Caves, 1971) generally conclude that there are indeed positive productivity spillovers from FDI to domestic …rms. Aitken and Harrison (1999) however criticize the methodology of the sectoral studies where positive spillovers were found, on the ground of an endogeneity problem. They argue that foreign investments primarily occur in sectors where domestic total factor productivity (TFP) is already high, thus leading to a critical identi…cation problem. Using panel data on Venezuelan plants and controlling for …xed di¤erences in productivity levels across industries, they …nd no signi…cant intra-industry spillovers from foreign …rms to domestic …rms. Other studies with …rm-level panel data also failed to identify positive spillovers from FDI, leading Gorg and Greenaway (2004) , in their extensive survey of this literature, to point out the inconclusive evidence emerging from several empirical contributions on the issue 1 .
More recently, Smarzynska Javorcik (2004), working on Lithuanian …rm-speci…c data, has been the …rst to detect signi…cant positive spillovers arising through backward linkages, i.e. generated through contacts between multinational a¢ liates and local input suppliers (vertical spillovers). She …nds instead no clear evidence in favour of either intra-industry e¤ects (horizontal spillovers), or forward linkages.
The …nding of positive vertical spillovers and no, or even negative, horizontal ones is in general ascribed ex-post to the existence of "market-stealing" e¤ects: in the product market, the domestic …rm's sales could be squeezed by the entry of the foreign competitor, leading to a decrease in productivity if adjustment costs prevent inputs to be reduced accordingly or if economies of scale are operating (Markusen and Venables, 1999) ; in the factor market, foreign …rms may attract the higher-skilled workers at the detriment of domestic …rms, since MNEs tend to pay higher wages (Aitken et al., 1996) , thus providing another channel through which the entry of a foreign …rm may 1 For example, limiting our attention to transition economies, the studies of Djankov and Hoekman (2000) on the Czech Republic, and of Konings (2001) on Bulgaria, Poland and Romania, either fail to …nd a signi…cant positive e¤ect or even detect a negative impact that multinational corporations generate on the performance of domestic …rms in the same sector. The situation is slightly di¤erent for developed countries, where some studies have found evidence of positive intra-industry spillovers (e.g., Haskel, Pereira and Slaughter, 2007, using UK plant level data). negatively a¤ect domestic TFP.
And yet, a precise assessment of these e¤ects has not been thoroughly analyzed in the literature, due to the restrictive approach employed in the estimation of spillovers. In general horizontal spillovers are measured by regressing, within a panel structure, some indicator of productivity of domestic …rms against an indicator of 'presence'of MNEs in the same industry 2 . By looking at the average sign and signi…cance of this coe¢ cient across sectors and over time (if employing a panel dataset), inference is then made on the presence or not of horizontal spillovers and their impact on the performance of domestic …rms. But a correct assessment of potential spillovers e¤ects implies reckoning that the latter are ultimately driven by two sources of variation: the (sector-speci…c) e¤ects of MNEs' entry across the observational units, and the change in the sign of these e¤ects over time. In other words, the marginal impact of MNEs on the performance of domestic …rms is not necessarily always positive or negative over time and across sectors.
In particular, in a recent contribution Buckley et al. (2007) have shown that, across sectors, there may exist an inverse u-shaped relationship between FDI and domestic productivity, so that beyond some level of foreign presence spillovers begin to fall 3 . In a related study, albeit through a di¤erent setup, Dri¢ eld and Love (2007) …nd a similar level of heterogeneity across industries, showing how di¤erent types of FDI in the United Kingdom have markedly di¤erent spillover e¤ects, thus leading to insigni…cant results when these e¤ects are pooled together. Although unable to test, the same Buckley et al. (2007) acknowledge that also the time dimension is relevant in assessing spillovers.
For example, the …rst mover foreign investor might generate positive spillovers for the domestic …rms, which are o¤set by further entry only at a later stage. On the contrary, the market-stealing e¤ect might predominate once FDI start to ‡ow in the host country, but, over time, the surviving local competitors might adapt their production processes to the changing market conditions, with their TFP actually increasing as more MNEs enter due to a selection e¤ect. It can also happen that a larger number of MNEs magni…es the learning opportunities for domestic …rms, thus resulting in a positive impact on TFP growth rates over time (Liu, 2008) .
Finally, for the internalization of foreign knowledge, …rms with a larger absorptive capacity can bene…t more from foreign knowledge (Aitken and Harrison, 1999) . Therefore, in industries where domestic …rms possess more absorptive capacity, the positive e¤ect of inward foreign investment on productivity will be stronger.
Based upon the previous considerations, we thus test two hypotheses:
1. entry of foreign multinationals has a non-constant impact when examining domestic productivity in relation to the number of foreign multinationals that entered the domestic industry; 2. the impact of foreign entry is stronger in industries where …rms are on average larger. 2 In the 'horizontal'case, the most commonly used indicator of MNEs'presence is the share of MNE's employment over total employment within the considered industry. Such a practice might be itself subject to some criticism, as discussed in the next sections. 3 The authors point to the fact that sectors in which there is a high level of foreign presence tend to be those in which Chinese …rms are rather weak and have relatively low productivity. This causes the positive relation to weaken across sectors and eventually become negative.
As discussed before, both hypotheses are tested within an empirical model that allows for a threshold number of foreign investments beyond which the impact on domestic productivity changes sign.
The Romanian dataset
Our dataset is composed of domestic …rms and a¢ liates of multinational enterprises operating during the period 1995-2001 in Romania, as retrieved from AMADEUS. In the case of Romania, the dataset reports information retrieved by the Romanian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the institution to which all …rms have to be legally registered and report their balance sheet data.
In particular, the 'intermediate'version of AMADEUS used in this paper includes data on 30,148 …rms for Romania (2004 edition) . See the Appendix for more information.
For every …rm we have sought information on its location within each of the eight Romanian regions and the industry in which these …rms operate (at the NACE-2 and 3 level, as reported in the Statistical Annex), as well as yearly balance sheet data on tangible and intangible …xed assets, total assets, number of employees, material costs and revenues (turnover). Moreover, we have gathered information on the year of incorporation in order to distinguish between …rms which have always been operating in the considered time span and …rms which have entered over the period, thus controlling for a possible sample selection bias resulting from unbalanced panel data, in line with the previous literature. Exiting …rms are also considered, recording as exiters those …rms which do not report any information after a given year. Finally, we have included in the sample only those …rms for which detailed information on the ownership structure is available: in particular, we have considered a …rm as foreign if more than 10 per cent of its capital belongs to a MNE, and domestic otherwise. However, we are not able to discriminate between di¤erent modes of foreign entry (acquisition vs. green…eld investment) 4 , motives for foreign entry (Dri¢ eld and Love, 2007) , or FDI's country of origin (Buckley et al., 2002 and 2007) .
Our …nal sample consists of a total of 10,650 employable …rms, 30 per cent of which are MNEs in 2001, with entry and exit dynamics reported in Table 1 . The distribution over time and across industries of MNEs is reported in Table 2 5 . In terms of representativeness, we have retrieved from our sample a yearly measure of regional output, summing the individual …rms'revenues operating in each region. We have then correlated these …gures with the o¢ cial regional …gures for Romania, obtaining a signi…cant positive correlation of 0.83 6 . As a result our …rm-level data seem to belong to an unbiased sample, being able to reproduce the actual evolution of output in Romania.
[ Table 1 and 2 about here]
Methodology
We have grouped the methodological issues related to the estimation of the relationship between the presence of MNEs and their impact on domestic …rm's performance under three headings: the estimation of the dependent variable (TFP), the regressors to include in the spillover regression, and the model design. Our aim is to openly discuss all these issues, assessing their relevance through di¤erent model designs and a number of robustness checks, in order to derive a precise assessment of the impact they might have on the eventual detection of horizontal spillovers.
The estimation of Total Factor Productivity
In terms of calculation of domestic …rm-speci…c productivity, we have initially followed the standard approach of de ‡ating our balance sheet data using disaggregated industry price indexes. In particular, we have employed a total of 48 NACE2 or NACE3 industry-speci…c price indices retrieved from the Eurostat New Cronos database, according to the classi…cation reported in the Statistical Annex 7 . We have proxied output with de ‡ated sales, given the better quality of these time series with respect to the ones reporting value added. The number of employees has been used as a proxy for the labour input, and the de ‡ated value of tangible …xed assets as a proxy for capital.
We have then estimated productivity measures at the …rm level within each NACE2 industry, in order to correctly identify industry-speci…c technological coe¢ cients and thus allowing us to correctly di¤erentiate between manufacturing and services 8 . Moreover, the estimation has been carried out via a semi-parametric estimation technique. In fact, using ordinary least squares when estimating productivity implies treating labor and other inputs as exogenous variables. However, as pointed out by Griliches and Mareisse (1995) , pro…t-maximizing …rms can immediately adjust their inputs (in particular capital) each time they observe a productivity shock, which makes input levels correlated with the same shocks. Since productivity shocks are unobserved to the econometrician, they enter in the error term of the regression. Hence, inputs turn out to be correlated with the error term of the regression, and OLS estimates of production functions su¤er from the so-called simultaneity bias. Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) , henceforth OP and LP, have developed two similar semi-parametric estimation procedures to overcome this problem 7 The classi…cation is known as Pavitt classi…cation and allows to divide industries into di¤erent technological patterns: economies of scale, traditional, high tech and specialised industries, plus services. The same grouping has been used by Davies and Lyons (1996) to divide industries into high, medium and low sunk costs. As such, the classi…cation allows us to consider market structures, and hence prices, as relatively homogeneous within each industry.
8 Imposing common input elasticities for …rms belonging to di¤erent industries would in fact result in an overestimation of productivity for …rms operating in sectors which have higher returns. The shortcoming of an industry-speci…c estimation is that, in a few cases (i.e. NACE16, 20), the number of …rm-level observations available for each industry has not allowed a proper identi…cation of the input coe¢ cients. Accordingly, TFP measures from …rms belonging to these industries have not been considered in the follow-up of our exercise. using, respectively, investment and material costs as instruments for the unobservable productivity shocks.
Since both methodologies have been employed in the literature, and both present some shortcomings 9 , in principle it is correct to compute productivity through both approaches in order to test the robustness of the TFP estimates. As shown in Figure 1 , the distribution of domestic …rms' TFP as retrieved through both the LP (unrestricted sample) and OP (restricted sample, positive investments) algorithms tend to overlap over the entire sampling period, once normalizing the TFP of a given …rm by the industry average (correlation of 0.8, signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 1 per cent level). Hence, any bias in the estimation of TFP eventually induced by the estimation technique can be ruled out, as long as our dependent variable is considered in …rst di¤erences 10 .
[ Table 3 and Figure 1 about here]
We have therefore opted to use the TFP estimates of individual domestic …rms retrieved from the LP procedure, since the latter allows us to exploit all the data in our sample. Note also that we have run our estimates for domestic …rms only, thus avoiding the possibility that the FDI status of a …rm might have an e¤ect on the choice of input factors, another potential source of bias in the estimates of productivity (Van Biesebroeck, 2005) . Table 3 reports the obtained production function coe¢ cients for a number of manufacturing and services industries. Not surprisingly, the latter display higher coe¢ cients of the labour input, even after correcting for the simultaneity bias, since services are typically more labour intensive.
Another important source of distortion in the estimation of TFP, not yet fully tackled by the spillovers literature, relates to the so-called omitted price variable bias in the measurement of domestic …rms'productivity. Since the seminal paper of Klette and Griliches (1996) , it is known that proxying physical inputs and outputs through nominal variables de ‡ated by a broad price index might lead to biased productivity measures, due to an omitted price variable bias induced by the correlation between (unobserved) individual …rms'prices and their used inputs 11 . Such a bias can potentially a¤ect the estimated TFP, and hence the spillover analysis, in various ways. On the one hand, inputs are positively correlated with the level of output, which is typically negatively correlated with prices. If individual …rm prices remain in the error term due to improper de ‡ating, then the error term and the inputs are positively correlated, which yields an underestimated coe¢ cient of labor and materials and thus distorted TFP estimates. On the other hand, improper de ‡ating leads to a measurement error in the output variable: if prices charged by domestic …rms are below the industry average, e.g. because of lower quality with respect to MNEs, the latter distortion will induce a downward bias in the estimated …rms-speci…c TFP, which in turn might lead to a spurious absence of horizontal spillovers 12 .
We assess these critiques in two ways: …rst of all, we follow Katayama, Lu and Tybout (2003) , who argue that taking industry and region-speci…c averages on …rm-speci…c TFP measures allows to partially counter the omitted price variable bias, since the cross-producer variation in productivity measures is much more problematic than the temporal variation of the population of plants. In addition, following the spirit of Klette and Griliches (1996) , we control for the degree of imperfect competition on the demand side of the market allowing for spatial substitutability in demand (e.g. as in Syverson, 2004) , assuming that deviations of domestic …rms' prices of outputs and inputs (our measurement error) have a spatial component which can be controlled for. To this extent, we develop a slightly modi…ed version of the original Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) algorithm, estimating an industry-speci…c production function augmented with regional …xed-e¤ects, in order to pick up di¤erent pricing powers of domestic …rms in the di¤erent Romanian regions.
The measure of MNEs'presence
In the traditional spillover regression, the presence of MNEs is measured through the ratio of multinational employees over total employment in the considered industry z, region j and year t.
A positive and signi…cant coe¢ cient for the variable related to MNE's presence in the industry is then interpreted as evidence of horizontal spillovers 13 . A lag structure imposed on the MNE-related variables allows to control for the potential endogeneity of the MNEs' presence in the selected region-industry pair.
A model design of this kind implies however that an equiproportional increase in the MNEs' employment and the total employment (thus yielding a constant share) will have no e¤ect on domestic …rms' productivity. But if the absolute values of the elasticities of foreign and total employment are di¤erent, Castellani and Zanfei (2006) have shown that using only the ratio of foreign to total employment downwardly biases the estimate of the coe¢ cient, and might thus be responsible for the lack of evidence on horizontal spillovers. As a result, we have compared the standard model design, where spillovers are captured by the horizontal penetration index, with a model design where the presence of MNEs is identi…ed by the number of the same multinationals operating in a given industry/region in a given year, controlling for the industry-speci…c average investment size.
Moreover, contrary to standard practice, we have opted not to time-di¤erence the covariates 1 2 Starting from …rms'i revenues Y expressed as quantities time prices, and considering PI as the industry average price index, taking logs of the de ‡ated revenue we have yi PI = qi + pi PI . To the extent that some domestic …rms price below the industry average, we have that (pi PI ) < 0 and thus our observed de ‡ated revenue yi PI is downward biased, leading to a similar bias in the TFP measure. 1 3 Vertical spillovers would then be measured by weighting the horizontal penetration index with the input-output coe¢ cients, as in Smarzynska Javorcik (2004). related to the MNEs' presence. In fact, a di¤erence in di¤erence spillover regression imposes the assumption that changes in productivity of domestic …rms are driven only by changes in the presence of MNEs, which is not necessarily true, since domestic …rms might be a¤ected di¤erently by the same stock of MNEs over time via learning (e.g. Liu, 2006) . We thus explicitly control for the learning hypothesis, by introducing in our regression the number of years since the …rst investment has taken place in a given industry/region.
The spillover regression
Our baseline model design is the standard spillover regression, relating domestic …rms'TFP to the presence of MNEs in the industry-region pair (Model 1):
In Equation (1), ln(T P F it ) is the change in the (log of) T F P of …rm i at time t and HP zjt is the index of horizontal penetration calculated as the ratio of multinational employees over total employment in the considered industry z, region j and year t. As it is standard in the literature, a positive and signi…cant would be interpreted as evidence of horizontal spillovers.
Such a speci…cation typically allows to tackle a number of econometric concerns. First of all, as already discussed, the unobserved heterogeneity which may a¤ect the correlation between …rm productivity and foreign presence is controlled for by …rst di¤erencing the (log of) TFP, i.e. using ln(T P F it ) in order to wipe out unobserved …rm-speci…c …xed e¤ects, and by including industry, region and time …xed e¤ects z , j and t , respectively. Lagging one period the MNEs-related variables allows us to control for the potential endogeneity of the MNEs'presence in the selected region-industry pair. Finally, since we perform a regression on micro units using mainly aggregate variables as covariates (at the regional and industry level) it is common practice to control for the potential downward bias in the estimated errors by clustering the standard errors for all …rm-level observations belonging to the same region-industry pair.
As already stated, such a model design implies, however, that an equiproportional increase in
MNEs' presence and total employment will have no e¤ect on domestic …rms' productivity, which might bias downwardly the estimate of the spillover coe¢ cient. To counter this possible criticism,
we compare the previous model with the following regression equation (Model 2):
where again ln(T P F it ) is the change in the (log) of T F P of …rm i at time t, D zjt 1 is a dummy variable related to the change in the number of MNEs taking value 1 if an investment is undertaken in industry z of region j in year t 1, and CumF DI zjt 1 is the cumulated number (in logs)
of foreign investments in industry z of region j at time t 1. The coe¢ cient thus captures the average e¤ect of a change in the horizontal MNEs' presence, while the coe¢ cient , which refers to the interaction of the investment dummy D zjt 1 with the cumulated number of FDI, captures the marginal e¤ects on domestic …rms'TFP. The implicit assumption in this model design is that we treat all foreign investments as equal, since no weights are assigned to the value of investments 14 . However, all econometric speci…cations are sector-speci…c, so that di¤erences in the size of investment across sectors (which account for the largest part of variation in …rms' values) are controlled for. In addition, we will provide a robustness check of our results controlling in what follows for the minimum e¢ cient scale.
Given our equation (2), a positive horizontal spillover from MNEs entry on the average change in domestic productivity is obtained, in principle, when + CumF DI zjt 1 > 0 15 . The ratio^ ^ derived from our model design is then a useful statistic to test the relevance of a FDI threshold around which the marginal e¤ect on domestic …rms' TFP change sign. In particular, the critical value of the number of foreign investors that determines the sign of the aggregate spillover can be calculated setting + CumF DI zjt 1 = 0. E.g., if > 0, < 0 and is signi…cantly di¤erent from 0, there exists a threshold value CumF DI = of FDI below which aggregate spillovers are positive. Spillovers then become negative as soon as MNEs'entry crosses the threshold.
As already hinted, an econometric concern in the previous speci…cation is related to the nature of CumF DI, a count variable which in principle treats as equal FDI in di¤erent industries, i.e. MNEs which are likely to be characterized by di¤erent …rms'sizes. If there is a systematic di¤erence over time in the size of MNEs which enter in each industry, ignoring it might lead to potential spurious correlations, not entirely captured by our …xed-e¤ects. However, having calculated the median size of the MNEs that have entered in each industry in each year, we can rule out speci…c trends over time in this variable, and thus we conjecture that our results are not driven by particular dynamics of speci…c industries. Finally, the cumulated number of foreign investments is a variable increasing over time, and hence non-stationary. Although the variable enters in our speci…cation always interacted with the investment dummy and time-e¤ects are included in our regression, we could still get a positive spurious relation between TFP and foreign presence, as well as problems with the asymptotic properties of our estimators, if there is serial correlation in the error terms.
Though the econometric literature in general acknowledges (e.g. Baltagi, 2001 ) that the problem is negligible in micro panels such as ours, characterized by a large number of cross-sectional units (48*8 in our case) with respect to time (6 years), we report the modi…ed version of the DurbinWatson statistic for balanced panels, as proposed by Bhargava et al. (1982) , in order to assess the extent of the problem for each model speci…cation.
To counter the omitted price variable bias and measure the impact of the MNEs'presence on the average domestic …rm, we have introduced a third model design (equation 3), aggregating …rm-speci…c TFP measures across the 48 industries and 8 regions over the years 1995-2001, thus using as a dependent variable the average TFP of industry z and region j at time t calculated over individual
where ln(T P F zjt ) is the average change of (log) domestic …rms'TFP in industry z and region j in year t. As we have argued, the latter treatment of the dependent variable yields us a balanced panel across industries, regions and years, and allows us to minimize potential biases in our TFP measure deriving from the heterogeneity in the mark-ups faced by individual …rms.
As a further re…nement, we have speci…ed an industry-speci…c threshold CumF DI z , in line with earlier studies suggesting industry-speci…c spillover e¤ects (Liu et al., 2000) and spillover e¤ects that are moderated by a measure of absorptive capacity (Sinani and Meyer, 2004) . Moreover, as already discussed, a shortcoming of the previous speci…cations is that FDI undertaken in industries characterized by di¤erent average …rm sizes, and thus di¤erent barriers to entry, are treated as equal. We have thus re…ned our model speci…cation so that the threshold depends on M ES z , the minimum e¢ cient scale 16 of industry z, as follows (Model 4):
Interacting CumF DI and M ES in the proposed way essentially implies to assign greater weight to those FDI undertaken in industries characterized by lower barriers of entry (lower M ES). We can therefore control for the industries in which the competition e¤ect from MNEs should be a priori stronger. Moreover, in the already quoted paper by Aitken and Harrison (1999) , it is claimed that one should distinguish between large and small domestic …rms, since it is more likely that industries characterized by larger …rms will possess a su¢ cient level of absorptive capacity to bene…t from the presence of FDI. The intuition explored in equation (4) is that industries characterized by larger …rms (i.e. a higher MES) should exhibit a higher critical threshold level of FDI after which their spillover becomes negative. Interacting CumF DI and M ES as reported yields in fact a critical value of the (industry-speci…c) threshold CumF DI z = M ES z .
Finally, to include an intercept in the latter linear relationship for the threshold, we can generalize the model design as (Model 5)
so that the threshold becomes CumF DI z = M ES z . In this case, we can then explicitly design a test statistic for both the coe¢ cient of our functional form, , and its intercept 17 .
The next section discusses the results of the various model speci…cations plus some additional control variables.
Our baseline results are presented in Table 4 . In the …rst column we test the benchmark model of horizontal spillovers to domestic …rms using …rm-speci…c productivity measures (Model 1). In line with the recent literature, we do not …nd signi…cant e¤ects 18 . In column 2 we test for the existence of a possible FDI threshold (Model 2), always using domestic …rm-speci…c productivity measures: we …nd a negative and signi…cant (at 10 per cent) sign of the interaction between D zjt 1 and CumF DI, thus indicating that the e¤ects on domestic …rms'productivity tend to change as the number of multinational increases. The critical value for the existence of the FDI threshold, , is positive but not signi…cantly di¤erent from 0. To assess whether our results are to a certain extent driven by a possible omitted price variable bias, in columns 3 and 4 we test again the two models, this time using the average productivity changes ln(T P F zjt ) as our dependent variable (Model 3). Again, we …nd positive but not signi…cant horizontal spillovers when tested through the standard speci…cation (column 3), but signi…cant threshold e¤ects (column 4). Having controlled for all other potential biases, the latter result might thus explain the lack of signi…cance of horizontal spillovers when tested through traditional model designs.
[ Table 4 about here]
In Table 5 we further explore this …nding through our re…ned model designs explicitly testing for the existence of the FDI threshold. For a matter of comparison, column 1 replicates the last column of Table 4 . As already discussed, we …nd that FDI undertaken at time t 1 has a positive and signi…cant impact on the average productivity changes in a given industry/region, providing evidence of positive horizontal spillovers. More speci…cally, the estimate for reveals that, on average, the …rst foreign investment in a speci…c sector and region increases domestic TFP by almost 3.5%. The e¤ect however decreases as the number of foreign investment in ‡ows increases (negative sign of the interaction between D zjt 1 and CumF DI). The critical value, , is positive and signi…cantly di¤erent from 0 at the 5% level of signi…cance. In particular, the threshold indicates that negative spillovers arise on average from the 12th investment on. The modi…ed Durbin-Watson statistic is very close to 2 across all model speci…cations, indicating no problems of serial correlation in the error terms.
Nevertheless, in the previous model speci…cation the estimate for is not signi…cantly different from 0, probably due to the industry-speci…c nature of . In fact, interacting the cumulated number of FDI with the inverse of minimum e¢ cient scale, calculated as the …rms' median employment in each industry, highly reduces the industry heterogeneity and yields signi…cant results, thus con…rming our hypothesis (Model 4) of the existence of an industry-speci…c threshold
Column 2 of the for each industry z and region j. The results are reported in column 3. Again, both and are signi…cant, as it is our test statistic > 0, thus indicating the presence of a threshold e¤ect. We cannot instead reject the hypothesis that the intercept, , equals zero at conventional levels of signi…cance.
[ Table 5 about here]
In column 4 we explicitly test for the 'learning'hypothesis as discussed by Liu (2006) , introducing in our benchmark model of the FDI threshold a variable T measuring the (log) number of years since the …rst foreign investment took place in a given industry/region. The latter allows us to counter a possible omitted variable bias arising from the fact that, if the investment dummy D zjt 1 is zero in our speci…cation, the change in productivity of our domestic …rm would not be a function of previous investment. As it can be seen, the variable is signi…cant and negatively signed, while the estimates of and do not change, as well as the signi…cance of our test statistic for the threshold > 0. Hence, ceteris paribus domestic …rms seem to experience a marginally decreasing change in productivity as time from the …rst investment goes by, consistent with the …ndings of Gri¢ th et al. (2002) who found that there might be a convergence in total factor productivity of domestic …rms towards the foreign ones, with the rate of productivity growth decreasing over time as more
MNEs enter in the local market.
Finally, in column 5 we test whether spillovers vary between the manufacturing and services sector. In our sample, services constitute around 13% of our observations (see the Statistical Annex for a list of industries, including services). To that extent, we introduce a dummy SERV taking value one if the considered industry belongs to the services sector, and interact the dummy with the variables driving the threshold.
While the main e¤ects remain unchanged for the manufacturing sector, including the signi…cance of our test statistic for the threshold, the e¤ects for services are di¤erent. In particular, in services the positive impact of the …rst investment on domestic …rms remains positive but is diminished by 3.8 percentage points, while the negative e¤ect induced by the increasing presence of MNEs is increased by some 39 percentage points, thus turning positive. Thus, the estimated coe¢ cients for and are both positive in the case of services, but not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero 19 . We also …nd that the FDI threshold is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero for the services sector, implying that the main results we found are driven by the behavior of spillover in manufacturing industries.
1 9 Denoting S and S the coe¢ cients for Dzjt 1 Serv and Dzjt 1
Serv respectively, the Chi-sq. and p-values of the test Ho: + S = 0 and Ho: + S = 0 are 0.03 (.85) and 0.02 (.88), as retrieved from Column 5 of Table 5 .
Our interpretation of these results is that, overall, there seems to exist a general pattern of spillovers from FDI where productivity is boosted in the year immediately after the investment has taken place (positive ), but then gradually decreases through both the changes in market structure (negative ), and the convergence to the frontier of domestic …rms, which seem to learn marginally less as time goes by (as in Gri¢ th et al., 2002) . The results are however di¤erent in the services sector, leading to no FDI threshold in these industries 20 . Table 6 presents a number of additional robustness checks of our …ndings, always controlling for the number of years since the …rst foreign investment took place in a given industry/region to avoid a possible omitted variable bias. In column 1, we speci…cally control for the actual number of foreign …rms entering in a given sector/region and year, since it may be the case that multiple entries in a given year would a¤ect di¤erently the performance of domestic …rms with respect to the case of a single FDI. Our variable IN V zjt 1 measures the total number of foreign investment undertaken in industry z of region j in year t 1 (taken as the log of 1 plus the number of foreign investments).
We maintain the interaction with our measure of FDI stock CumF DI, in order to keep the same interpretation of the threshold value, and we always control for the average investment size M ES.
The results are unchanged, with the value of our test statistic for the threshold more than doubled.
Following the related literature (e.g. Sinani and Meyer, 2004) , as a further robustness check we have augmented our benchmark speci…cation with the Her…ndahl index calculated for both domestic and foreign …rms (column 2a) or for domestic …rms only (column 2b). We have also included a proxy for domestic …rms'absorptive capacity, measured as the average investment in intangible assets over total assets in a given industry/region, and introduced a control for the stock of FDI cumulated at the beginning of our observation period (column 3). We do not …nd signi…cant e¤ects of the Her…ndahl index or the initial FDI stock on the domestic …rms'average TFP, while the absorptive capacity index is positive and signi…cant, in line with other results obtained in the literature (e.g. Damijan et al., 2003) 21 . As it can be seen, our estimates of and are very robust to these di¤erent model speci…cations, as well as our hypothesis of a zero intercept term in our threshold expression.
Finally, as a further robustness check, we have recalculated our estimates using a di¤erent measure of domestic …rms' TFP, and namely the one retrieved by estimating an industry-speci…c production function augmented with regional …xed-e¤ects, in order to pick up di¤erent pricing powers of domestic …rms in the di¤erent Romanian regions. The results, presented in column 4, show that the threshold remains signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to perform a robustness check of the threshold e¤ect with respect to a change in our de…nition of foreign ownership (10 per cent of capital stock, following the o¢ cial IMF de…nition of foreign investment, as it is common in most studies). Nevertheless, we can draw on results from Spatareanu and Smarzynska Javorcik (2006) , who, on a similar sample of Romanian …rms from 1998 to 2000, show that positive horizontal spillovers are likely to increase with the percentage of foreign ownership. Hence, we expect the threshold to increase when a more restrictive de…nition of foreign ownership (i.e. majority or wholly-owned investment) is considered.
[ Table 6 about here]
Reinterpreting our exercise in a policy perspective, we have exploited the estimates of and reported in column 2 of Table 5 to calculate the FDI thresholds. Given the model design, the results, reported in Table 7 , present the industry-speci…c thresholds of FDI for the average region.
For example, Table 2 shows that the cumulated FDI in the pharmaceutical industry (NACE 243-245) equals to 35 investments for the entire country. Since this …gure is lower than the average region-speci…c threshold retrieved in Table 7 (56), the pharmaceutical industry appears to be a sector where domestic …rms can still bene…t from inward FDI.
[ Table 7 about here] In terms of managerial implications, our results do not exclude that the presence of MNEs can prima facie bene…t domestic …rms. Actually, we do …nd a spillover e¤ect for the initial investments in a given region / industry. However, we also provide robust evidence that, after a given threshold in the FDI presence, the spillover e¤ect is outweighed by a marginally decreasing role of learning, as domestic …rms convergence to the technology frontier (e.g. Gri¢ th et al., 2002) , and by a negative competition e¤ect. As far as the latter is concerned, the negative impact of an increasing
MNEs' presence on domestic …rms' productivity can be consistent with the traditional marketstealing e¤ect identi…ed by the international business literature (e.g. Buckley et al., 2007) . In fact, if we assume that foreign entry crowds out market shares of domestic …rms, the latter would experience a reduction of their economies of scale, and thus of their TFP, with the e¤ect becoming immediately evident in industries were economies of scale are relatively low. Consistently, we have indeed found that industries relatively more characterized by economies of scale display the highest FDI threshold. Scale and market stealing e¤ects are known to be di¤erent in the services sector (Capar and Kotabe, 2003) , and can thus also justify the di¤erent results we obtain for services industries vs. manufacturing ones.
However, our results also point to a di¤erent channel driving negative spillovers, more directly related to the strategic choices in the international allocation of (tangible and intangible) assets by Nesting these results into ours, we could therefore claim that the decrease in the importance of horizontal spillovers associated with an increasing presence of MNEs might derive also from a technological channel, since our results are consistent with strategic choices of MNEs in which the technological transfer is interrupted after a certain number of rivals'entries.
In terms of policy implications, the study therefore suggests that FDI attraction policies should focus on sectors where the marginal e¤ect of foreign entry is positive, typically industries characterized by high economies of scale, as from our Table 7 for Romania. In sectors where the number of cumulated FDI is still below the calculated threshold, the spillover e¤ect is likely to outweigh the competition e¤ect and bene…ts for the productivity of local …rms might be expected. In industries characterized by lower critical FDI thresholds, instead, any new FDI entering the market risks aggravating negative spillovers to domestic …rms. Moreover, if we acknowledge that negative spillovers might also derive from strategic choices of MNEs linked to the risk of knowledge appropriation by rivals, adequate and e¤ective policies protecting intellectual property rights might also play a signi…cant role in magnifying positive spillovers for domestic …rms.
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